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Data security breaches have been consistently 
identified in literature as significant, negative events. 
While most of the related research focuses on 
externally initiated breaches, far fewer studies provide 
clarity related to internally initiated breaches. The 
risk of internal breaches may be dramatically 
increased by shadow information technology (IT). Our 
study examines German and Italian financial 
executives’ decisions to engage in shadow IT in 
combination with two potential mitigation techniques 
(severity of sanctions in violation of IT policy and 
outcome effect related to breach risk). While Italian 
executives act as predicted, German executives 
engage in a different decision-making process 
whereby a self-service business culture brought on by 
perceived increased IT capabilities supersedes the 
level of cybersecurity awareness and a strong IT usage 
policy. Results also suggest an outcome effect favoring 
increased likelihood of breaches may lessen the 
likelihood of shadow IT usage. Our study adds an 
international component to existing data security 
breach and shadow IT research, while also 
contributing to the IT usage policy, neutralization 
theory, dynamic capabilities, outcome effect, and self-
service literatures.   
1. Introduction  
Intensive data analysis combined with hybrid 
(i.e., working in the office or at home during the week) 
or remote work arrangements, have led to an 
individualization of data processing [1]. Omnipresent 
in these work environments is the concept of self-
service business analytics (henceforth, self-service), 
which enables data users to implement their own 
information technology (IT) channels to be able to 
solve business problems. If these IT channels are not 
 
1 Germany and Italy represent two symbolic archetypes of 
Northern and Southern European cultures, respectively (Del Junco 
and Brás-dos-Santos 2009). We examine financial executives, 
known/accepted/supported by the centralized IT 
department, then the channels represent “shadow IT” 
[2, 3]. Shadow IT is any software, hardware, or IT 
service processes that are used and/or developed 
autonomously by user employees or their departments 
without including the company's own IT department 
[4]. While there is some anecdotal evidence of positive 
outcomes related to shadow IT use (e.g., increased task 
efficiency) [5], the negative consequences are not as 
clear. We argue that using shadow IT channels to 
complete daily tasks creates a potentially costly 
scenario where a financial executive (e.g., the Chief 
Financial Officer [CFO]) may be unaware of or 
unconcerned with the associated IT risk [6]. 
Specifically, we examine financial executives’ 
decisions to use shadow IT, which could lead to data 
security breaches (DSBs). 
The World Economic Forum estimates that $5.2 
trillion is at risk of DSBs [7]. Further, Kaspersky Lab 
notes that approximately 90% of breaches occur from 
social engineering techniques (i.e., phishing attacks) 
[8]. Clarity on insider breach antecedents is scarce in 
the extant academic research [9], but recent anecdotal 
sources are starting to point the finger at shadow IT 
messaging channels [3]. Thus, the purpose of our 
study is to examine German and Italian financial 
executives’ shadow IT decisions as a potential cause 
of internal of DSBs.1 Our areas of exploration include 
the executive’s level of cybersecurity awareness 
(CSA) and two shadow IT mitigation techniques (IT 
usage policy and breach outcome effect). 
Investigating a sample of 229 experienced 
executives, we consistently find a significant country 
x CSA interaction. Specifically, high CSA German 
executives are more likely to engage in shadow IT 
behavior than those with a low level of CSA and 
relative to their Italian peers. This result provides 
evidence of the self-service behavior and dynamic IT 
because of their high level of involvement in information systems 
use (e.g., end-user computing research; Leon et al. 2010). 







capabilities guiding German executive behavior over-
and-above cyber risk knowledge. Similarly, we also 
consistently find evidence that German financial 
executives are more likely to engage in shadow IT 
behavior than Italian financial executives and 
increasing the salience of DSB risk significantly 
reduced the likelihood of both countries’ executives’ 
shadow IT behavior. We do not find any evidence that 
CSA or a strong IT usage policy deters shadow IT 
behavior. Overall, our study’s results suggest 
differences between the executives’ shadow IT 
behavior exist more at an individual business 
environment/firm level than at a country/cultural level. 
Our findings add theory-based and practice-based 
contributions to multiple Information Systems (IS) 
literatures: all of which takes place in US settings. The 
findings also add to our understanding of outcome 
effects in the DSB literature, which primarily focuses 
on external DSBs/hacks [9, 10]. Our findings suggest 
a firm environment-effect to shadow IT behavior and 
by extension, internal cyber policies and risk. Adding 
considerations related to a self-service work 
environment and the theory of dynamic capabilities 
put specific conditions on when increasing employee 
CSA would be effective as a preventive firm control 
against DSBs. Our study proceeds as follows. The next 
section provides a literature review of shadow IT 
research. Then, we consider CSA with self-service and 
dynamic capabilities to determine potential reasons for 
country-level differences and follow with associated 
mitigation strategies. Our research method is next 
presented, followed by the results and study 
conclusions. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
Development 
2.1. Shadow IT 
In principle, shadow IT serves to support business 
processes, more precisely, the process activities of the 
users. For the IT department, shadow IT represents a 
form of loss of transparency and control. Shadow IT 
includes solutions that are uncontrolled, technically 
discoverable, and hidden, but completely removed by 
IT monitoring [11].2 For example, firms may have 
several different messaging apps (e.g., WhatsApp) 
 
2 Shadow IT should not be seen as end-user computing or user-
managed computing. End-user computing represents a process in 
which the user develops applications in an environment that allows 
access to computer, data, and support resources (Benson 1983). 
User managed computing is maintenance by the computer’s owner, 
including additional software installation or configuration 
(Concordia 2020). 
used by employees on an ad-hoc basis either for cost 
or productivity reasons [3]). 
Although shadow IT is not new (two-thirds of IT 
managers acknowledge shadow IT as an existing 
phenomenon in their organization) [12] it is growing 
in size. Perhaps more concerning is approximately 
50% of IT managers are concerned about the 
breakdown of mission critical shadow IT [12]. The 
main reason for the pervasive nature of shadow IT is 
that tech-savvy, financial executives implement IT 
autonomously [13]. However, the benefits come along 
with managerial problems. In the case of Software as 
a Service (SaaS) deployed as shadow IT, studies show 
that 40% of employees see reliability, security, and 
access risks [14]. Our focus is on the security aspect of 
shadow IT. Firms may not realize that shadow IT use, 
such as through messaging apps or other remote work 
applications, create vulnerabilities resulting in DSBs 
[3]. Conversely, Myers et al. [15] contemplate that in 
some cases, managers might not be willing to adopt 
shadow IT tools if they feel skeptical about the 
accuracy of information produced. 
More specifically, we argue shadow IT can 
increase internal DSB risk. The potential productivity 
gains and increased DSB risk represent a double-
edged sword to tech savvy CFOs [16]. Data from 
CompTIA [17] identify more than 50% of DSBs 
derived from human error due to a lack of compliance 
with IT security policies or to a lack of expertise with 
websites or apps. Ironically, employees do not 
consider human errors as a major cyber concern [17]. 
Since most DSB studies focus on hacks and other 
externally initiated DSBs [9, 10], examining potential 
antecedents to internal breaches is still evolving.3 The 
following sections discuss relevant theory to 
investigate this issue. 
2.2. Cybersecurity Awareness 
CSA refers to how much end users know about 
the cyber security threats their networks face and the 
risks they introduce [18].4 Recent research argues that 
since end users have system access and are therefore a 
major vulnerability, firms should provide CSA 
training and education [19]. CSA effectiveness 
research examines the topic both at the firm and 
individual levels. At the firm level, both Gordon, 
Loeb, and Sohail [20] and Berkman et al. [21] examine 
3 See Richardson, Smith, and Watson (2019) for a comprehensive 
literature review. 
4 We acknowledge that while DSB risk is an important component 





cyber-related disclosures and find that the market 
positively perceives this information, although a 
negative tone in the disclosure is associated with a 
lower market value.  
Our focus is on individual, executive judgment. 
Goss [22] states that effective information security 
involves control over both IT and internal personnel 
with system access. Several behavioral studies discuss 
consequent employee responses to internal controls 
attempting to prevent access to systems by 
unauthorized parties [23, 24]. The main concern in this 
literature is phishing.5 Vishwanath, Herath, Chen, 
Wang, and Rao [25] and Brios, George, and Zmud [26] 
argue that domain-specific knowledge related to CSA 
can reduce an employee’s susceptibility to being 
successful phished, although the authors concede that 
said knowledge must be gained through experience.   
Phishing-related research implies that the user 
unwittingly surrenders sensitive system access 
information to unauthorized parties. While that can be 
a serious concern for many firms and lead to DSBs, it 
is not directly related to shadow IT. A related line of 
research suggests that CSA is not sufficient on its own 
to curtail non-compliance of cybersecurity-related 
policies improving the chances of vulnerabilities and 
eventually DSBs [27]. We next explore this 
possibility. 
2.3 Self-Service and CSA 
Goss [22] argues that firms should understand 
their employees’ intent to comply with cyber-related 
policies in order to be able to gauge DSB risk. A 
related stream of research discussed in Vishwanath et 
al. [27] indicates that some beliefs have an immediate, 
preconscious impact on judgment [28]. In our context, 
these beliefs, if strong enough, would supersede CSA 
by itself. Strong beliefs in task efficiency and 
expediency are represented in the literature by the 
concept of “self-service.”  
Self-service shifts software-supported data 
analysis away from the prepared solution by an IT 
department to dynamic execution by the specialist user 
[29]. A self-service scenario in Germany is typical, for 
example, in contexts where specialist users develop 
spreadsheet programs or work with analytics tools: 
often in conjunction with database management 
systems. Thus, self-service represents the move away 
from a centralization of the analysis towards a 
decentralization of analytical information systems, so 
 
5 Phishing is an email-based deception where an individual 
camouflages emails to appear as a legitimate request for personal 
and sensitive information (Bose and Leung 2007). 
that more professional-oriented users with technical 
skills (e.g., financial executives) can act individually 
in the organizational context.  
If self-service exists as an instantiation of shadow 
IT, a significant drawback is that there is little thought 
and effort related to all integration aspects of the IT, 
including installation. Coordination between 
executive users and IT takes time. Therefore, if an 
executive needs to complete a task requiring 
integration of new IT and/or data sources (web, social 
media, etc.), that executive must weigh the importance 
of task expediency relative to IT support. 
While a self-service belief is consistent with many 
German financial executives engaging in analytical 
tasks, it is largely anecdotal. From a theory-based 
perspective, self-service is consistent with the 
dynamic capabilities construct. The development of 
new capabilities can be understood as an enabler to 
new business models [30], management approaches 
[31], business structure [32], or operational procedures 
in business departments. Dynamic capabilities are 
defined as the ability to reconfigure a firm’s 
operational capabilities to face current needs [33]. The 
implementation of self-service analytics, either as an 
official approach or in the context of shadow IT, is part 
of an organic shift towards digitized data. Some 
subjects such as organizational structure and 
organizational culture are less common in the study of 
the digital transformation than business processes and 
business models. Changes in organizational structures, 
such as flattened hierarchy and the integration of more 
tele-workers [32], and an agile culture can contribute 
to more flexible and agile organizations, which might 
be better suited to face the digital transformation [34]. 
However, these same changes cause leadership 
challenges and pressure on the work organization [35] 
that are often not identified in prior research.  
The prior literature on digital transformation 
suggests maturity models, structured steps approaches, 
and views linked to the development of dynamic 
capabilities as ways to manage the changes and 
accompanying expectations introduced in their firms.
6
 
For example, firms could benefit from a flexible 
change model [34] and the development of operational 
and dynamic capabilities [30]. As the unpredictability 
related to expedient completion of tasks requiring new 
IT or using IT in a new (i.e., remote) environment 
increases, an extension of the concept of dynamic 
capabilities such as executive improvisational 
capabilities (relevant in the context of self-service, 
6 We recognize the vastness of the digital transformation construct. 
Our intent is not to test this construct, per se, but rather to link it to 





shadow IT behavior), could help firms increase their 
flexibility when it is not possible to plan a 
configuration change [33]. New projects and new 
business model clash with the old business 
organizations, which can hinder progress or prevent 
real transformation [36], but hide activities like 
shadow IT.  
In sum, both the anecdotal, self-service literature 
and theory of dynamic capabilities are linked to the 
German business environment. The same evidence is 
not as prevalent in the Italian business environment, 
despite the digitization of data and consequent usage 
of data analytic software being a global phenomenon. 
Given the self-service prevalence in the German 
business environment, we predict that if task 
expediency beliefs (i.e., self-service) are perceived as 
more important than CSA, high CSA German 
financial executives will be more likely to engage in 
shadow IT behavior than either their Italian 
counterparts or low CSA German financial executives 
(i.e., an interaction between CSA and country). 
H1: The level of CSA and country of origin interact 
such that high CSA, German financial executives 
are the most likely group to engage in shadow IT 
behavior.  
 
Now that we have discussed the possibilities why 
shadow IT behavior occurs, we move on to identify 
potential methods to mitigate said possibilities. 
2.4 IT Usage Policy 
Prior research shows that the extent of compliance 
with an IT policy is the result of a cost-benefit trade 
off, whereby perceived benefits are counterbalanced 
by formal sanctions and security risks [37]. The 
inclination of an executive to engage in Shadow IT 
behavior may be influenced by diametrically opposed 
factors. For example, deterrence theory postulates that 
a stronger IT policy may hinder the likelihood of an 
individual to engage in deviant behaviors [37]. In 
particular, severity of sanctions and likelihood of 
being detected are found significant predictors of 
individual behaviors [37, 38]. However, the relation 
between severity of sanctions and IT compliance is far 
from being unequivocal. Sanction severity may play a 
counterproductive effect on IT usage policy 
compliance when individual norms contradict the 
official IT policy [37]. In this context, high severity 
sanctions may be perceived as a lack of trust by 
employees and may consequently weaken their loyalty 
in contrast with the IT usage policy [39, 40, 41]. 
The contradiction of a deterrent, firm strategy in 
favor of personal norms is consistent with 
neutralization theory [42]. Neutralization theory posits 
individuals acting against the law, regulation or social 
norm will adopt a way of reasoning to legitimate 
themselves and minimize or avoid public blame [43]. 
Siponen and Vance [44] find that neutralization is a 
significant predictor of the employees’ intentions to 
act in violation of firm IT security policies. Silic et al. 
[43] conduct a deeper dive into the topic and find 
evidence identifying neutralization as a significant 
predictor of an individual’s intention to violate IT 
policies. Deterrence theory and neutralization theory 
considered in combination widen the spectrum of 
research by showing that the effects of deterrence on 
individual IS security policies compliance depend on 
the context. Both Li et al. [37] and Shoemaker et al. 
[45], provide evidence that individual behaviors are 
driven both by official norms and personal beliefs, but 
when the two conflict, the latter prevails. In our 
context, if engaging in shadow IT behavior is 
unacceptable per a formal IT usage policy, but is 
acceptable by an individual executive, the executive 
may engage in shadow IT behavior. 
Additionally, when deviant behaviors are 
generally not stigmatized, the deterrent effect of 
sanctions could be less powerful [45]. This scenario 
could be true in a shadow IT context, since IT users 
may think that the information systems threats are not 
a dramatic danger for the firm or the cost of the 
sanction is perceived to be less than the benefit of the 
task completed expediently and independently. In our 
shadow IT context, the success of severe sanctions for 
non-compliance of IT usage policies, as well as the 
influence of neutralization resulting in personal norms 
superseding official firm norms is equally possible. 
Accordingly, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H2: There will be no difference in financial    
executives’ shadow IT behavior for strong and 
weak IT usage policies. 
2.5 Breach Risk, Outcome Effect 
Given the uncertainty of effectiveness related to 
IT usage policies and shadow IT behavior, we now 
consider a second mitigation technique identified in 
the prior literature as affecting individual judgment: 
the outcome effect. The outcome effect refers to 
decision maker judgments being affected by their 
outcomes and has most prominently been analyzed in 
the performance evaluation literature [46]. 
Specifically, outcomes systematically impact 
evaluators’ judgment of the quality of the decision. 
Hershey and Baron [19] find that outcomes can inform 
decisions in certain contexts by defining them as 
“good” or “bad.”  
Baron and Hershey [19] find that disclosing the 




outcome effect in medical and gambling 
environments. Brazel, Jackson, Schaefer, and Stewart 
[47] find that even though consultation with auditor 
superiors (thereby informing the superiors of the 
auditors’ decision-making process) can improve 
performance, the outcome effect is not mitigated by 
the consultation. Tan and Lipe [46] theorize that when 
the decision maker has significant control over the 
outcome, then that outcome is useful in assessing the 
decision maker’s performance. The opposite is argued 
for outcomes with a low level of controllability. Their 
results were mixed with controllability over the 
decision only mattering for experienced, business 
individuals and bad news outcomes. The authors 
reason experienced, businesspeople engage in a 
functional decision-making whereby it is the bottom-
line judgment that counts most (and positive results 
are rewarded, while there is no “extra blame” for 
negative results).  
The aggregate literature suggests the outcome 
effect is prevalent even in experienced, businesspeople 
and that controllability of decisions matters for 
experienced individuals in bad news conditions. We 
extrapolate that consistent finding to a shadow IT 
environment and predict the following: 
H3: When a related DSB risk is known, financial 




Italian data was collected through an online 
questionnaire administered through Google Form. 
Respondents received an email invitation to contribute 
to the survey with a link that allowed them to access 
the questionnaire (every version had its own link). The 
Italian emails were sent to the Executive MBA in 
Auditing and Management Control alumni database 
from a large Italian university. The database included 
approximately 1,150 records randomly divided into 
four groups; every participant received invitation for 
only one version of the questionnaire. 134 responses 
were received for a response rate of 11.7%. Nine 
respondents were eliminated for having an incomplete 
questionnaire resulting in a final sample of 125. 
Respondents were solicited until almost an equal 
number of observations for all the four versions of the 
questionnaire were collected. The participants reside 
throughout Italy and currently work as senior financial 
executives (e.g., CFO) of large firms (defined as 
having more than 250 employees; European Union 
2015). 
A similar data collection process was used for the 
German participants. The invitation to participate the 
survey and the link to access the questionnaire was 
sent to German financial executive members of The 
Data Warehouse Institute (TDWI) Europe. 104 
financial executives were solicited and responded for 
a 100% response rate. 
Sample demographics are depicted in Table 1. 
59.2% of the Italian sample are female compared to 
35.6% of the German sample. All participants have at 
least a Bachelor’s degree with 80% of Italians and 
58.7% of Germans earning Master’s degrees. The 
average age of participants was over 40 for both 
groups. Further, the executives in our sample were 
very experienced with both groups having an average 
of over 15 years of work experience, with 
approximately 10 years of experience with their 
current employer. Table 1 also shows that there is a 
wide variety in the number of times the executives 
installed software either at home or work and the 
executives had relatively low levels of self-reported 
coding experience. In aggregate, our sample 
comprised educated, experienced financial executives 
with at least some coding and software installation 
knowledge. 
Table 1. Sample Demographics 
Country Germany Italy 
Sample size 104 125 













Average (SD) Age  43.87 (9.88) 40.78 (11.18) 
Average Years (SD) Work 
Experience 
17.74 (9.98) 15.55 (11.70) 
Average (SD) Times 
Installing at Work 
7.88 (12.15) 8.62 (14.74) 
Average (SD) Times 
Installing at Home 
15.85 (17.10) 17.73 (20.15) 
Experience with Coding 
Languages (SD) 
3.47 (2.17) 2.20 (1.69) 
Years Worked for Current 
Employer (SD) 
9.70 (7.55) 10.79 (10.90) 
3.2 Research Design 
After providing a welcome statement and consent 
to participate information, the instrument included 
background information on a fictional company called 
CBR – a multinational company with 1500 employees 
headquartered “in the participant’s country” with 
operations in Germany, Italy, and the US. Participants 
were told additional information related to no turnover 
in the chief executive officer position; 6% earnings 
growth in past four years; CBR being highly 




problems; a centralized IT department; and a usage 
policy statement requiring employees to only use IT 
that are approved by the IT department. After the 
background information, the experiment placed 
participants in the finance-area of CBR where most 
work is done in Excel. At that point, the case scenario 
states the following: 
A software vendor has recently introduced you to a new 
business intelligence/analytics tool (“the tool,” henceforth) 
which could be used to work at a faster pace. Relative to 
Excel, the tool is easy to use, reduces the amount of manual 
tasks (and data quality errors), and can be used/shared on 
mobile devices. However, CBR’s IT department said that the 
new tool would take several weeks to purchase and then fully 
implement. If you purchase and implement the tool yourself, 
it would take approximately half of a day. The tool requires 
a greater level of access rights to sensitive CBR data than is 
currently granted. The IT department typically grants 
increased data access rights upon request from personnel in 
your department.  
The instrument prompts the participants to 
respond to the dependent variable question (see 
below), before moving on to the IT usage policy and 
DSB outcome effect manipulations (where they see 
the same question again after each manipulation), 
demographic questions, and cyber awareness and 
culture variable scales. Participants were randomized 
into IT usage policy and DSB outcome conditions. 
3.3 Dependent Variables 
We proxy shadow IT behavior as the likelihood the 
executive would install a new tool on their work 
computer (implying that the executive would not wait 
for IT to conduct the installation).7 Specifically, the 
question states, “On a scale of 0 to 10 (where 0 = you 
would not install the tool; 5 = you are not sure; and 10 
= you would definitely install the tool), please indicate 
the likelihood that you would install the new tool 
yourself on your work computer.” Our dependent 
variables represent an initial judgment (IJ), a revised 
judgment (RJ; after the IT usage policy manipulation), 
and a final judgment (FJ; after the DSB outcome effect 
manipulation). Thus, we have a repeated measures 
design where we measure the scale result each time, 
but also measure the magnitude of belief revision (i.e., 
RJ-IJ and FJ-RJ) to glean any possible additional 
insights.8  
 
7 IT department approval of the software tool is also part of this 
issue, but is included in the upcoming IT usage policy variable 
discussion. 
8 We also examine FJ-IJ in an untabulated analysis, but do not find 
any additional/incremental insights. 
9 We substitute country born in and find almost identical results. 
3.4 Independent Variables and Covariates 
Our mixed design includes a 2x2 of manipulated 
variables (strength of IT usage policy [henceforth, 
USAGE] and DSB outcome effects [henceforth, 
OUTCOME]) and two measured variables (CSA, and 
country of current residence). The USAGE 
manipulation is adapted from Shoemaker et al. [45] 
and Malimage et al. [48] whereby the strong condition 
states warnings are given if the policy is violated and 
three warnings can result in termination. The weak 
manipulation states that the violator meets with the 
head of the department, but no official warnings are 
given. The OUTCOME manipulation is derived from 
anecdotal and academic research cited in Tan and Yu 
[49] and Kelton and Pennington [50]. Specifically, the 
manipulation involves a statement that either says 
“many data breaches…” (strong) or “no data 
breaches…” (weak) have resulted from others 
downloading the same analytics tool that is being 
offered to the participants. 
Our CSA measure is adapted from Lif et al. [51] 
and comprises two statements: one about importance 
of the firm’s IT and another regarding how urgent 
taking action against a cyber-attack would be. The 
Cronbach’s Alpha between these two items was 0.82; 
therefore, we summed the items into a single measure. 
The country variable (henceforth, COUNTRY) was 
measured based on participants’ current residence as 
either Italy or Germany.9  
Next, all demographics from Table 1 were tested 
as potential covariates. Only the number of times 
participants installed software at work (henceforth, 
TIMES) was significant and included in the upcoming 
ANCOVA analyses.10 Additionally, we consider 
macro-level differences in culture as additional 
covariates, given the German-Italian differences 
mentioned earlier [52]. Hofstede and Minkov [53] 
identify six dimensions of a nation’s value 
system/culture. The six dimensions are: power 
distance (PD); individualism (INDIV); masculinity 
(MASC); uncertainty avoidance (UA); long-term 
orientation (L-T); and indulgence (IN). Our review of 
the literature and untabulated correlation analyses with 
our DVs identified only PD, IN, and INDIV as 
appropriate for our context (the other three variables 
were tested, but nothing was significant). The scale 
components for all three variables all have Cronbach’s 
10 We measured participants’ motivation using a seven-point scale 
ranging from 1 (not motivated) to 7 (extremely motivated). 
German executives were significantly more motivated (mean [SD] 
= 5.46 [1.39]) than Italian executives (mean [SD] = 4.53 [1.61]; t = 
4.63, p < 0.001), but both were significantly above the midpoint (p 
< 0.001 for both countries), suggesting that participants on average 




Alpha’s > 0.80 and, thus, were summed into individual 
variables.11 We split and analyze CSA and the three 
culture variables at the median to guard against data 
skewness affecting our results.12  
4. Results  
4.1 Hypothesis Testing 
Recall that H1 predicts an interaction effect 
between COUNTRY and CSA. Table 2, panel A 
provides the initial results involving IJ as the 
dependent variable. Panel B provides the mean values 
for each CSA and COUNTRY.  
Table 2. H1 and H2 Testing (CSA and COUNTRY) 
Panel A: ANCOVA Results (n = 229) 
Source of 
Variation 




57.99 1 57.99 6.46 0.01 
COUNTRY 99.66 1 99.66 11.10 <0.001 













 TIMES 35.47 1 35.47 3.95 0.05 
Model 241.54 7 34.51 3.84 0.001 
Intercept 1030.77 1 1030.77 114.81 <0.001 
Panel B: Cell Means 





n = 53 
5.33  
(2.88) 
n = 51 
5.95 
(2.87) 





n = 77 
5.08 
(3.30) 
n = 48 
4.62 
(3.20) 





n = 130 
5.21 
(3.08) 
n = 99 
 
 
The results support H1 by showing a significant 
COUNTRY X CSA interaction (F-stat = 6.46, p = 
0.01) in the predicted direction (the high CSA group 
that is more likely with the German executives to 
download the tool [mean [SD] = 6.55 [2.77]] than the 
low, German group [mean [SD] = 5.33 [2.88]] or 
either of the Italian executive groups [high CSA mean 
[SD] = 4.32 [3.13]], low CSA mean [SD] = 5.08 
[3.30]]. This result provides some initial evidence that 
 
11 For expositional purposes, we only present the significant 
culture variables (at p < 0.10) in the upcoming analyses. Further, 
we asked a total of three manipulation check questions (two for 
USAGE). Results suggest our manipulations were successful as 
only 12 Italian and six German executives failed at least one check 
and were removed from the sample. 
12 We conduct a series of additional testing to add credibility to our 
median split design choice where median value scores are included 
with the “high” condition. First, we include the median values in 
the German self-service business environment 
involving dynamic capabilities supersedes the level of 
CSA. When interpreting all main effects, we find that 
COUNTRY is significant with the German financial 
executives more likely to download the tool (overall 
mean [SD] = 5.95 [2.87]) than are the Italian Financial 
Executives (overall mean [SD] = 4.62 [3.20]); F-stat = 
11.10, p < 0.001). There is a marginally significant 
result for the IN covariate (F-stat = 2.91, p = 0.09).13 
IT Usage Policy (H2). Having established 
shadow IT differences above, we now consider 
mitigation techniques starting with USAGE (H2). 
Table 3, panel A provides the ANCOVA results and 
panel B includes the relevant cell means.  
Table 3. H2 Testing (IT Usage Policy) 
Panel A: ANCOVA Results (n = 215) 
Source of 
Variation 




5.01 1 5.01 0.57 0.45 
COUNTRY 56.31 1 56.31 6.43 0.01 
CSA 0.06 1 0.06 0.00 0.99 













TIMES 4.75 1 4.75 0.54 0.46 
Model 138.09 8 17.26 1.97 0.05 
Intercept 2750.86 1 2750.86 314.05 <0.001 
Panel B: Cell Means 





n = 50 
4.37  
(2.67) 
n = 49 
4.46 
(2.66) 





n = 69 
3.62 
(3.31) 
n = 47 
3.45 
(3.22) 





n = 119 
4.00 
(3.01) 
n = 96 
 
 
The COUNTRY X CSA interaction term is not 
significant (F-stat = 0.57, p = 0.45) since the German 
Financial Executives are more likely to download the 
tool regardless of CSA level. This result is supported 
when examining the COUNTRY main effect (German 
financial executives overall mean [SD] = 4.46 
[2.66]; Italian Financial Executives overall mean [SD] 
= 3.45 [3.22]; F-stat = 6.43, p = 0.01). USAGE is not 
the “low” conditions. Second, we eliminate all median values. 
Third, we eliminate all values within 10 percent of the median. The 
last two tests were to avoid interpreting results where values were 
“bunched” at the median. Our inferences do not change when 
considering all three additional tests.  
13 Throughout hypothesis testing, we interact all three culture 
variables with COUNTRY, CSA, and eventually each of the 




significant (F-stat = 0=1.30, p = 0.26) with PD 
marginally significant (F-stat = 2.86, p = 0.09). The 
above results do not specifically show the magnitude 
of potential of participants’ belief revision after having 
received the USAGE manipulation (i.e., repeated 
measures).  
Thus, we also examine the magnitude of 
judgment belief revision in untabulated analysis. We 
find a significant amount of belief revision in the 
COUNTRY X CSA interaction term (F-stat = 9.12, p 
< 0.01). The means suggest that it is the high CSA 
group that is accounting for the significance. 
Specifically, the high CSA German executives are 
reducing their likelihood to download the tool (mean 
[SD] = -2.24 [0.30]) significantly more than the high 
CSA Italian executives (mean [SD] = -0.86 [0.27]). 
This difference does not exist in the low CSA 
conditions (German executives’ mean [SD] = -1.00 
[0.31], Italian executives’ mean [SD] = -1.37 [0.30]). 
These numbers also help to explain the marginally 
significant difference between countries overall 
(German executives’ overall CSA mean [SD] = -1,62 
[0.30], Italian executives’ overall CSA mean [SD] = -
1.14 [0.28]; F-stat = 2.97, p = 0.09). In aggregate, we 
fail to reject H2, but find some stronger support for 
H1. Even though the strong/weak USAGE 
manipulation did not differ among conditions, its 
presence helped to significantly reduce the high CSA 
German financial executives’ likelihood of 
downloading the new tool.14 
DSB Outcome Effect (H3). Our last shadow IT 
mitigation technique considers the potential impact of 
outcome knowledge (H3). Table 4, panel A provides 
the ANCOVA results and panel B includes the 
relevant cell means. We again find a significant 
COUNTRY X CSA interaction term (F-stat = 4.65, p 
= 0.03). Examining the means in panel B, we see a 
reversion back to the IJ results whereby the German 
executives are much more likely than their Italian 
counterparts to download the tool at the high CSA 
level (German executive mean [SD] = 5.68 [2.98], 
Italian executive mean [SD] = 2.95 [3.31]) and relative 
to those German executives in the low CSA group 
(mean [SD] = 4.65 [2.87]). When looking at the other 
variables of interest, we find consistent evidence of a 
significant COUNTRY main effect indicating German 
financial executives are more likely to download the 
tool (overall mean [SD] = 5.14 [2.93]) than are the 
Italian Financial Executives (overall mean [SD] = 3.29 
[3.25]; F-stat = 21.22, p < 0.01). We also find a highly 
significant OUTCOME effect (F-stat = 32.33, p < 
0.001) in the predicted direction. We do not find 
 
14 In additional testing, we interacted USAGE with all other 
independent variables, but do not find any significant results.  
statistical significance with USAGE (F-stat = 0=1.61, 
p = 0.21) but the IN covariate is significant (F-stat = 
3.95, p = 0.05). 
Table 4. H3 Testing (Outcome Effect) 
Panel A: ANCOVA Results (n = 211) 
Source of 
Variation 




37.68 1 37.68 4.65 0.03 
COUNTRY 171.99 1 171.99 21.22 <0.001 
CSA 1.32 1 1.32 0.16 0.69 
OUTCOME 262.11 1 262.11 32.33 <0.001 
USAGE  13.06 1 13.06 1.61 0.21 
IN 32.03 1 32.03 3.95 0.05 
INDIV 1.18 1 1.18 0.15 0.70 
PD 9.17 1 9.17 1.13 0.29 
Covariate: 
TIMES 
16.99 1 16.99 2.10 0.15 
Model 575.80 9 57.58 7.10 <0.001 
Intercept 3070.07 1 3070.07 378.71 <0.001 
Panel B: Cell Means  





n = 49 
4.65  
(2.87) 
n = 49 
5.14 
(2.93) 





n = 67 
3.65 
(3.13) 
n = 46 
3.29 
(3.25) 





n = 116 
4.32 
(3.03) 
n = 95 
 
  
Analogous to the H2 testing above, we also 
examine the magnitude of belief revision in 
untabulated analysis. We find a marginally significant 
amount of belief revision in the COUNTRY X CSA 
interaction term (F-stat = 3.72, p = 0.55). Considering 
the means, we see that it is the high CSA group that is 
accounting for the significance. Specifically, the high 
CSA German executives are reverting back towards 
their initial judgments by increasing their likelihood to 
download the tool (mean [SD] = 1.08 [1.95]) and the 
high CSA Italian executives make a small decrease in 
their desire to download the tool (mean [SD] = -0.20 
[2.23]). This reversion may be recognition on the part 
of the German executives that they over-revised their 
earlier judgments when given the USAGE 
manipulation. The difference is not as pronounced in 
the low CSA conditions (German executives’ mean 
[SD] = 0.37 [1.43], Italian executives’ mean [SD] = 
0.02 [1.96]). These numbers also help to explain the 
significant difference between countries overall 




[1.72], Italian executives’ overall CSA mean [SD] = -
0.11 [2.13]).  
We conduct additional testing to further elaborate 
our COUNTRYXCSA results. Specifically, we 
perform planned contrasts and Bonferroni analyses 
retesting our hypotheses. Untabulated results support 
the ANCOVA results reported above. Our aggregate 
evidence finds strong support for H1 and H3 and fail 
to reject H2.15  
5. Conclusion 
There is a long history of shadow IT use and end-
user computer in employees ranging from entry level 
staff to top executives. Remote and hybrid working 
arrangements have significantly accelerated the use of 
workaround apps executives feel they need to use to 
be productive [3]. A major concern of firms, then, is 
that regardless if the IT department knows about the 
app use, it cannot manage the security profile 
adequately, risking an internally-caused DSB. 
According to the World Economic Forum [7], DSB 
risk is a global issue with $5.2 trillion in potential 
costs. While the extant DSB literature is 
predominantly US-based and focused on external 
hacks [9, 10], international academic research 
surrounding internal breach causes and mitigation 
strategies is scarce. Our study attempts to fill this gap 
in the literature.  
First, we find strong evidence that German 
financial executives with high CSA levels being most 
likely to engage in shadow IT behavior (and in 
conjunction, increasing internal DSB risk). This 
finding is consistent with our IT dynamic capabilities 
and self-service arguments surrounding this group. 
Further, one aspect that continuously came up in our 
post-experiment debriefing was the importance of the 
business departments’ relationship/alignment with the 
IT department. The Italian executives were 
consistently reporting more of a willingness to allow 
the IT department to manage all applications than were 
the German executives. While we controlled this 
aspect in our experiment, future research should 
further investigate this relationship and attempt to find 
ways to align the departments. Relatedly, future 
research should more closely examine the impact a 
self-service perspective and IT dynamic capabilities 
have on various judgments.     
Next, multiple studies tout strong and clear IT 
usage policies (and employee training on said policies) 
as a method of encouraging compliance with IT-
 
15 Additional testing interacts OUTCOME in all possible 2-way 
and 3-way interactions. No significant results are obtained. The 
lack of COUNTRY X OUTCOME interaction suggests a 
related behavior at firms, deterring more 
individualistic, IT-behavior and potentially decreasing 
DSB risk [54, 48]. Analogously, academic research 
advocates for increasing employees’ CSA, perhaps 
even tying in the firm’s IT usage policy to do so, to 
improve compliance and mitigate DSB risk [21, 54]. 
Our results contradict these suggestions, although 
there is some evidence that a strong IT usage policy 
revises shadow IT beliefs in the desired direction. 
While we consistently find differences in intended 
shadow IT behavior between the financial executives 
in both countries, we find only inconsistent evidence 
related to our macro-level, cultural covariates. 
Therefore, when comparing the relative influence of 
deterrence and neutralization theories, our findings are 
more closely tied to the latter theory where an 
individual’s norms (self-service in our context) 
supersede the firm’s norms.  
Finally, we find strong evidence suggesting a 
breach outcome effect impacts shadow IT behavior. 
Combined with our lack of CSA findings, this result 
indicates there may be a difference in shadow IT 
behavior when considering one’s trait vs. situational 
(i.e., state) cyber awareness. Future research should 
investigate this possibility. 
Our study makes important academic and 
practical contributions. It adds novel insights and 
context to the shadow IT, international DSB, self-
service, dynamic capabilities, IT usage 
policy/deterrence theory, outcome effect, and 
neutralization theory literatures. Specifically, results 
of intentional actions complement those of the 
anecdotal and phishing literatures showing internal 
DSBs being caused by human error. Further, our 
experienced sample of financial executives commonly 
make critical business decisions and, thus, our study 
builds on Myers et al.’s [15] shadow IT research 
involving management decision making. Yet, our 
results raise new questions that create opportunities for 
future research. For example, even though the 
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) was newly in existence during our data 
collection, and a potentially negative outcome effect 
was provided, German financial executives (on 
average) still pursued their own method to secure the 
necessary IT to complete a task – increasing the risk 
of an internal DSB. Future research should delve 
deeper into executives’ behavior involving GDPR and 
how it has changed/not changed internal firm 
processes related to shadow IT and internal DSB risk.      
consistent pattern for the German Financial Executives relative to 
their Italian peers. That is, regardless of OUTCOME strength, the 




Our study is subject to multiple limitations. First, 
although our participants come from two major 
European economies representative of northern vs. 
southern Europe, our results may not be generalizable 
to financial executives from other countries. Future 
research should investigate our effects of interest using 
financial executives from other economies including 
the US, South America, China, UK, etc. Next, our 
experimental design captures financial executives’ 
intentions, which is separate from actual behavior. 
Future research should capture actual, individual 
behavior. Third, we cannot completely rule out the 
possibility that our IT usage policy manipulation is not 
strong enough to elicit a response, despite pilot testing 
involving two German managers. Finally, our sample 
and experimental design are exclusive to large firms 
and their financial executive’s behavior. Thus, small 
and medium-sized firms are not represented.   
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